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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A Door in the Illinois Brick Wall-A Functional
Equivalent to the Cost-Plus Contract Exception
I. INTRODUCTION
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court held that,
with narrow exceptions, indirect purchasers may not sue alleged
price fixers who are remote from them in the distribution chain for
treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.2 This decision
was, according to the Court, the logical outgrowth of its earlier
holding in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.3 that
an antitrust violator may not, as a general matter, assert as a de-
fense to price fixing that the direct purchaser plaintiff was not in-
jured because it passed on any illegal overcharges to its customers.
Illinois Brick has been criticized, however, as a serious obstacle to
private antitrust enforcement, and there have been continuing ef-
forts to overrule it legislatively.4 Nevertheless, the Court's reluct-
ance to adjudicate passing-on 5 issues stands as a key consideration
in antitrust actions alleging price fixing in a multilevel distribution
system. As a result, an indirect purchaser or seller victimized by a
price-fixing conspiracy must fit his complaint within "the narrow
1. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
3. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
4. On legislative efforts to overturn Illinois Brick, see Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1424-27 (1978); Note, Treble Damages and the Indirect Purchaser
Problem: Considerations for a Congressional Overturning of Illinois Brick, 39 OHIO ST. L.J.
543 (1978).
5. Stated simply, "passing-on" is the "process whereby a businessman who has been
overcharged adjusts his own price upward to reflect the overcharge." McGuire, The Passing-
On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover
Shoe, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 177, 181 (1971). The practical effect of passing-on is that a buyer
other than the original purchaser in a multilevel system of distribution pays part or all of
the initial overcharge.
Passing-on analysis is not, however, limited to suits by purchasers alleging illegal over-
charges. For example, sellers may pursue buyers one or more steps removed in the vertical
distribution chain if the former have been injured by the latters' conspiracy to depress prices,
provided that their transactions fall within one of the exceptions adumbrated in Illinois Brick.
Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust
Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 311 n.11 (1978). See Part IV infra.
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scope [the Court] intended for any exception to its rule barring
pass-on"' claims, or continue to suffer the injury until a direct pur-
chaser or seller brings suit and prevails.
To date, the only exception to the bar against offensive or de-
fensive assertion of passing-on7 permitted by the Supreme Court8 is
when an overcharged buyer has a preexisting "cost-plus" contract.
Because such a contract makes it easy to prove that the buyer has
not been damaged, the Court has determined that the considera-
tions requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted are not
present.' Two recent circuit court decisions reveal, however, that the
scope of this exception is unsettled. In Mid-West Paper Products
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., I" the Third Circuit took the position
that it would "not extend the exception beyond the limited circum-
stances recognized by the Supreme Court."" Accordingly, the court
held that the use of passing-on theory is impermissible unless its
proponent can show preexisting, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contracts
at every level of the distribution chain, with the result that he
absorbed the illegal overcharge in its entirety. 2 In In re Beef Indus-
try Antitrust Litigation, 3 however, the Fifth Circuit declared that
if the exception is confined to "cases involving literal cost-plus con-
tracts," then it "is a narrow one indeed."" Rejecting such a rigid
construction, the court held that the exception is also applicable
when allegations of rigid formula pricing by middlemen and struc-
tural inelasticity of short term supplies 5 compel recognition of a
6. 431 U.S. at 736.
7. Although the Court in Illinois Brick did not explicitly address the question of whether
these exceptions applied to both offensive and defensive passing-on theory, the Court's rea-
soning indicates that if the facts of a particular case facilitate proof of passing-on, the purpose
underlying such proof would be immaterial. Note, Recovery by Indirect Purchasers and the
Functions of Antitrust Treble Damages, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1445, 1454 (1977).
8. In its discussion of possible exceptions in Illinois Brick, the Court added in a footnote
that "fa]nother situation in which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on
defense might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its
customer." 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. That situation, however, would present a unity of interest
not present in the typical pass-on case since the indirect customer could compel the direct
purchaser (a proper plaintiff) to sue in any event.
9. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
10. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
11. Id. at 577 n.9.
12. Id. at 577.
13. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979).
14. Id. at 1166 (citing Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d
573 (3d Cir. 1979)).
15. The case presented allegations of inverted passing-on. Specifically, cattlemen al-
leged that retail grocers had conspired to depress beef prices and that packers "passed-on"
these wholesale price depressions to the ranchers and feeders. Because fattened cattle must
be sold within three weeks of reaching choice grade, the cattlemen must accept the packers'
quoted price. The supply of fat cattle is therefore inelastic in the short term. 600 F.2d at 1154.
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"functional equivalent" of the cost-plus contract.'" This Recent
Development examines the conflict between the circuits in light of
the principles underlying the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick rule to
determine the feasibility and implications of recognizing a func-
tional equivalent to the cost-plus exception.
II. THE REJECTION OF PASSING-ON THEORY
A. Evolution of the Rule- Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.'7 was a
treble damages action against a manufacturer of shoe machinery
under section 4 of the Clayton Act by a lessee of the machinery. The
plaintiff claimed that United's practice of leasing, rather than sell-
ing, the machinery resulted in illegal overcharges in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. 8 United contended, however, that
Hanover had sustained no damages since it had passed on any ille-
gal overcharges to its customers in the form of higher retail prices."
Thus, the question presented was whether an antitrust violator may
avoid liability by showing that its direct purchaser passed on its
added costs and hence suffered no injury from the violation.
In affirming the trial court's refusal to hear such evidence, the
Supreme Court noted that "'[t]he general tendency of the law, in
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.' "20 The
Court rejected United's argument that economic principles com-
pelled recognition of the defense when the overcharge both caused
and enabled the buyer to pass on the full amount to his customers.
The Court reasoned that
[a] wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies. Normally the
impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after
the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact
been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions
more buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen
a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world
rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a
company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a differ-
ent volume of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that
16. Id. at 1166. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the Third Circuit's holding in Mid-West
that a direct purchaser from a nonconspiring competitor lacks standing to sue the conspira-
tors for treble damages. Id. at 1166 n.24. Both courts agreed, however, that the Illinois Brick
rule has no application to claims for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
17. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
19. 392 U.S. at 487-88.




the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the overcharge
and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there
would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the par-
ticular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices absent the over-
charge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued.
Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense would require a
convincing showing of each of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task
would normally prove insurmountable.
2'
In short, the Court viewed any attempt to reconstruct the subjective
dynamics of a past pricing decision as a practical impossibility be-
cause of the multiplicity of factors that come to bear in the market-
place.
Finally, the Hanover Shoe Court expressed concern that recog-
nition of a passing-on defense would substantially reduce the effec-
tiveness of the treble damages action as an antitrust deterrent. By
precluding recovery by direct purchasers, the defense would place
enforcement of the antitrust laws in the hands of ultimate con-
sumers who "have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest
in attempting a class action. '2 Consequently, the Court feared that
violators would retain their illegal profits because no one would be
available to sue them.2 3 In this regard, Professor Posner admits that
the amount of the overcharge was indeed greater than the actual
damage suffered, but notes that the Court was forced to choose
between overcompensating the plaintiff and underdeterring the de-
fendant. The Court's preference for the former, he continues, "is
consistent with the view that the primary purpose of antitrust dam-
age actions is to deter violations of law.
' 24
Having rejected the defensive use of passing-on except in
limited circumstances, the Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
2
1
adopted a rule of symmetry with respect to offensive passing-on by
barring indirect purchasers from suing whenever the remote seller
is precluded from asserting the passing-on defense against his direct
purchaser. In Illinois Brick, the State of Illinois and 700 local gov-
ernment entities brought a treble damages action alleging that de-
fendants, manufacturers of concrete blocks,' had engaged in a
21. 392 U.S. at 492-93.
22. Id. at 494.
23. A survey of relevant cases indicates that direct purchasers have in fact been "the
backbone of private antitrust enforcement." Handler, supra note 4, at 1425-26; Handler,
Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 1001 (1977).
24. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMic NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 149 (1974).
25. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
26. The block manufacturers sold to masonry contractors, who in turn sold to general
contractors, from whom plaintiffs purchased the blocks in the form of completed masonry
structures.
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price-fixing conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 27 The Court argued that, unless the rule regarding passing-on
in treble damages actions applied equally to plaintiffs and defen-
dants, defendants would be subjected to a serious risk of multiple
liability. Therefore, since Hanover Shoe allows a direct purchaser
to recover the full amount of any overcharge regardless of passing-
on, the indirect purchaser should not, by proving passing-on, re-
cover the same amount. Such overlapping recoveries would, accord-
ing to the Court, be certain to result from a rule that presumes "that
one plaintiff (the direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while
preventing the defendant from using that presumption against the
other plaintiff.
' '28
More importantly, the Court drew heavily on Hanover Shoe's
assessment of the uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing price
and output decisions in the real economic world, 29 emphasizing that
these factors had been the most compelling reason for rejecting the
passing-on defense.30 In fact, the Court reasoned that the eviden-
tiary complexities and uncertainties would be multiplied in an of-
fensive passing-on case brought by a plaintiff several steps removed
from the defendant in the distribution chain because passing-on
proof would have to be repeated at each point at which the price-
fixed goods changed hands.3' Section 4 of the Clayton Act was, the
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
28. 431 U.S. at 730. It has been argued, however, that the multiple liability problem
can be overcome by means of numerous procedural devices. For example, a plaintiff's recov-
ery could be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account until the statute of limitations
becomes a bar to further claims, with the fund accessible only to those who sue within the
statutory period and establish damages. Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble
Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883, 926 n.175.
Alternatively, a court might require the original claimant to post bond sufficient to satisfy
any future actions by aggrieved parties. Note, supra note 7, at 1449.
29. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
30. 431 U.S. at 731-32. The Court concluded that the "effective enforcement" rationale,
see text accompanying notes 22-24 supra, was of only secondary importance in light of
Hanover Shoe's recognition of a cost-plus contract exception to the passing-on bar. A cost-
plus contract will not increase an indirect purchaser's stake (and hence, his incentive to sue)
in a lawsuit, but it does ease the complicated task of demonstrating that the direct purchaser
did not absorb the overcharge. 431 U.S. at 732 n.12.
31. Id. at 732-33. The Court conceded, however, that offensive passing-on cases are
simpler in one respect than defensive passing-on cases brought by direct purchasers. In the
latter, even if the defendant could show that the direct purchaser increased his price by the
full amount of the overcharge, the direct purchaser could still claim injury due to reduced
sales volume caused by higher prices. The reduced volume injury is not present in suits by
final purchasers, however, because the only issue is whether plaintiff paid a higher price due
to the initial overcharge. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that "the difficulty of reconstruct-
ing the pricing decisions of intermediate purchasers at each step in the chain beyond the
direct purchaser generally will outweigh any gain in simplicity from not having to litigate the
effects of the passed-on overcharge on the direct purchaser's volume." Id. at 733 n.13.
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Court conceded, designed to compensate antitrust victims as well
as to deter violators and deprive them of their ill-gotten gains. Nev-
ertheless, the Court could not countenance "carry[ing] the com-
pensation principle to its logical extreme by attempting to allocate
damages" throughout the chain of distribution 2 because it
"question[ed] the extent to which such an attempt would make
individual victims whole for actual injuries suffered rather than
simply depleting the overall recovery in litigation over pass-on is-
sues." 33 Before turning on to the exception to the passing-on rule, it
is necessary to examine the economic considerations underlying
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.
B. The Economics of Passing-On
The ability of an intermediate purchaser to pass an overcharge
along the distributive chain34 depends greatly upon the relative elas-
ticities of supply and demand for his product, or, in other words,
"the responsiveness to price changes of quantities supplied and
demanded."35 The full overcharge that results from an antitrust
violation can be passed on to indirect purchasers only when demand
is perfectly inelastic-when buyers will purchase a specified quant-
ity regardless of price fluctation.5 The assumption of perfect inelas-
ticity, however, is unrealistic, because demand always exhibits
some sensitivity to price in real economic markets.
37
32. In this connection, Professor Posner admonishes that the compensation rationale
could logically be extended beyond the immediate chain of distribution, limited only by
considerations of proximate cause and, ultimately, common sense:
The troublesome question is where to draw the line. Everybody's economic welfare
is bound up with everybody else's. Why stop with the ultimate consumer? If he is forced
to pay a higher price for a product, his demand for other products will fall and this may
hurt the suppliers of those products, and the suppliers' suppliers, and so on ad infinitum.
R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 149.
33. 431 U.S. at 746-47. In support of this "deterrence before compensation" rationale,
see Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust
Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 605 (1979).
34. This discussion will focus on the straight passing-on situation. The same considera-
tions, however, apply in general to inverted passing-on cases, see note 15 supra, as does the
Illinois Brick rule. [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 822, at B-5.
35. Schaefer, supra note 28, at 887. Elasticity is an economic concept used
to compare the responsiveness of one variable to a given change in another variable while
avoiding problems posed by the arbitrariness of the economic dimensions in which either
variable is stated. Elasticity of supply, for example, measures the responsiveness of the
quantity of a commodity supplied to changes in the price of that commodity without
reference to either units of output or dollars.
Id. at 887 n.22.
36. Note, supra note 5, at 312 n.14.
37. R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 148. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONoMics 379-86
(1973).
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Herein lies the crux of the passing-on problem. Real market
forces prevent any seller from fully avoiding injury from anticompe-
titive activity by passing the entire overcharge along the chain of
distribution:38 he must either absorb part of the overcharge himself
or, if he raises his price by the full amount of the increase, suffer a
corresponding reduction in sales volume, and hence a net decrease
in profits. Assuming profit-maximizing behavior, each actor in the
chain of distribution will seek to determine the price at which it can
pass on the maximum percentage of the overcharge without depress-
ing the market for its product .3 It is precisely this business decision
that the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe said involved such "a wide
range of factors" that proving the specific figures calculated therein
"would normally prove insurmountable."" Aside from the practical
impossibility of proving the factors contributing to a company's
pricing decisions there remains the problem of demonstrating the
point elasticities that come to bear on the volume of sales issue.
Although economic techniques are available that can be used to
estimate point elasticities, the practical shortcomings of such esti-
mations would merely augment the guesswork inherent in proving
passing-on."1 This doubtless helps to explain why no antitrust court
has attempted to estimate an elasticity of supply or demand.42 In-
deed, the totality of these factors has led one authority to conclude
that "conducting litigation of [such] dimension . . . either would
be impossible as a practical matter or would be so expensive that
the goal of compensation would be totally frustrated. There are no
short-cuts for resolving pass-on issues on a mass scale. '4 3 Thus, an
assessment of these economic factors is essential in framing any
exception to the passing-on rule.
1I. THE COST-PLUS CONTRACT EXCEPTION
A. Basis for the Exception
As noted," the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick carved out an exception to the rule barring passing-on claims
38. Note, supra note 5, at 312 n.14. The converse is also true, namely, an intermediate
puchaser will rarely be compelled to absorb the entire overcharge himself. R. POSNER, supra
note 24, at 148.
39. The ratio of the overcharge absorbed by the indirect and direct purchaser, respec-
tively, equals the ratio of the elasticities of supply and demand in the market in which the
product is sold. Note, supra note 7, at 1450 n.34.
40. 392 U.S. at 492-93. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
41. Landes & Posner, supra note 33, at 619.
42. Id.
43. Handler, supra note 23, at 1002.
44. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
19801
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:481
for situations involving preexisting, cost-plus contracts.45 Read liter-
ally, these cases require: (1) a preexisting contract,(2) specifying a
fixed quantity of products to be sold, (3) with the price per unit to
be determined by adding an agreed-upon markup to the seller's own
cost. Thus defined, the exception contemplates a situation that
rarely occurs.4" The net effect of such an arrangement is to make the
purchaser's demand for the particular commodity completely ine-
lastic; he is committed to buy the same quantity at any price and
thus bears the full amount of the initial overcharge.47 This occurs,
however, only if the contract fixes the quantity to be purchased;
otherwise, remote purchasers would be free48 to vary the amount of
their purchases according to changes in price. This freedom would
in turn necessitate a determination of the relative elasticities of
supply and demand in the resale market to assess the extent, if any,
of the direct purchaser's injury.49 Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick,
however, indicate that an antitrust litigant cannot force this inquiry
to be made."
Aside from the fixed-quantity requirement, it must be stressed
that a preexisting cost-plus contract, and not simply adherence to
cost-based price setting, is necessary to invoke the exception. In
Illinois Brick, for example, the Court refused to recognize an excep-
45. Under a cost-plus contract a customer pays a specified markup above the seller's
own cost for the product. Elaborating on the "narrow scope" of the cost-plus contract excep-
tion, the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick noted that
[i]n such a situation, the purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result
of attempting to pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed to buying a
fixed quantity regardless of price. The effect of the overcharge is essentially determined
in advance, without reference to the interaction of supply and demand that complicates
the determination in the general case.
431 U.S. at 736.
46. [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 822, at B-6.
47. Schaefer, supra note 28, at 917. Such a result does not mean, however, that the
direct purchaser necessarily escapes injury; he may still have a cause of action to the extent
that the overcharge prompts potential customers to purchase elsewhere, thus diminishing his
total profits. Note, supra note 5, at 329 n.87.
48. This statement assumes, of course, that buyer demand will never be perfectly ine-
lastic. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
49. Schaefer, supra note 28, at 917-18. Arguably, a direct purchaser might force this
evaluation to be made even when he did sell under a fixed quantity arrangement, see note
47 supra, although the issue has apparently not arisen to date. See text accompanying note
96 infra.
50. The Court in Illinois Brick conceded that reduced sales volume would not be at issue
in suits by final purchasers against remote sellers. See note 31 supra. Therefore, an indirect
purchaser arguably need not show that his cost-plus contract also specified a fixed quantity
to be purchased. The problem with this argument, however, is that the direct purchaser in
such case would, presumably, also allege injury from his reduced volume of sales, in which
event the court would still be called upon to reconstruct the direct purchaser's pricing deci-
sions. The court, however, apparently will not engage in such inquiry. But see Part IV infra.
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tion based on the fact that contractors5 purported to charge a fixed
percentage above their costs. Such "cost-based rules of thumb"5- are
not, according to the Court, adhered to rigidly; rather, "the extent
of the markup (or the allocation of costs) is varied to reflect demand
conditions. . . . The intricacies of tracing the effect of an over-
charge on the purchaser's prices, costs, sales, and profits thus are
not spared the litigants. '53 Moreover, even assuming that a particu-
lar market or industry exhibits "generally accepted" markups, vari-
ations from these rules of thumb occur in a fashion similar to secret
price shaving within a cartel. 4 One authority has explained the
phenomenon as follows:
Two problems underlie the tendency for informal price-fixing and output-
restricting agreements to break down. First, the parties to the conspiracy may
have divergent ideas about appropriate price levels and market shares, making
it difficult to reach an understanding which all will respect. Second, when the
group agrees to fix and abide by a price approaching monopoly levels, strong
incentives are created for individual members to cheat-that is, to increase
their profits by undercutting the fixed price slightly, gaining additional orders
at a price which still exceeds marginal cost. 55
In practical terms, any attempt to classify various market situations
as "resembling," and hence paralleling, cost-plus contracts invaria-
bly leads to the same evidentiary problems that the passing-on rule
sought to avoid.56
B. Precedents
The decisions of the lower federal courts-most of which, unfor-
tunately, predate Illinois Brick-have done little to clarify the para-
meters of the cost-plus exception. Several cases that have allowed
indirect purchaser suits have noted the exception but failed to base
their decisions solely on the presence of a cost-plus contract 7.5 Other
courts, however, have been more bold. In Standard Industries, Inc.
v. Mobil Oil Corp.,5" for example, plaintiffs, general construction
51. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
52. In general, pricing rules of thumb "typically involve some variant of the full-cost
or cost-plus pricing principle, in which a 'normal' or desired profit margin or percentage
return on invested capital is added to estimated unit costs to calculate the product price."
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 173 (1970).
53. 431 U.S. at 744 (citation omitted).
54. Note, supra note 5, at 330 n.91.
55. F. SCHERER, supra note 52, at 160.
56. 431 U.S. at 745.
57. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973),
appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975).
58. 475 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1973).
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contractors, had purchased liquid asphalt from certain of the defen-
dants, who contended that the plaintiffs had passed on any over-
charges and hence had suffered no damage. On appeal the Tenth
Circuit approved the lower court's instruction to the jury that the
passing-on defense "is generally available only to a 'cost-plus' con-
tractor or to a middleman who buys a product then resells same in
unchanged form to a consumer under such condition that the origi-
nal cost and handling charges can be traced with a fair degree of
certainty."59 This instruction .hardly confined the exception to the
narrow boundaries noted above. The fact that the instruction was
merely intended to enlighten the jury, however, coupled with the
appellate posture of the case, suggest that its value as an expansive
precedent is limited at best.
The Second Circuit considered the cost-plus exception in West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,"0 an action by wholesalers, retailers,
government purchasers and ultimate consumers against a drug
manufacturer who had charged illegally high prices. Certain whole-
sale and retail plaintiffs argued, on the basis of Hanover Shoe, that
ultimate consumers should not have been allowed to share in the 100
million dollar settlement fund because the complexities of passing-
on precluded their proving specific injury." Rejecting this argu-
ment, the Second Circuit responded that the ultimate consumers
had in fact borne part of the overcharge since the retailers had
generally sold the excessively priced drugs on the basis of fixed
percentage markups analogous to preexisting cost-plus contracts.
Again, however, the precedential value of this case must be dis-
counted because it was a settlement proceeding in which a majority
of each class had agreed to the resolution. 3
Two other pre-Illinois Brick cases deserve mention because of
their divergent treatment of the reduced volume issue" in passing-
on analysis. In Obron v. Union Camp Corp.,6" plaintiff was a whole-
saler who solicited orders for mesh window bags produced by defen-
dant; in a practice known as "drop shipping," plaintiff forwarded
its orders to defendant, who shipped the goods directly to plaintiff's
59. Id. at 224 n.1 (emphasis supplied).
60. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
61. 440 F.2d at 1084-86.
62. Id. at 1088. Interestingly, some of the direct purchasers admitted in the district
court that they had suffered no injury and did not want to share in the recovery. West Virginia
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
63. Comment, In the Face of Uncertainty-The Passing-On Concept in Civil Antitrust
Litigation, 27 ARK. L. Rav. 83, 128 (1973).
64. See notes 38-39 & 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
65. 355 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973).
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customers. The parties operated under a pricing arrangement by
which Obron purchased the bags at five percent below list price and
then resold at list price. Responding to Obron's claim that defen-
dant had conspired to create a monopoly in the manufacture and
sale of such bags by maintaining and enforcing an invalid patent,
Union urged that this pricing arrangement enabled plaintiff to pass
on any overcharges and hence to avoid injury. The court allowed
Union's defense, reasoning "that if there is not a 'pre-existing "cost-
plus" contract' present here the situation is so strikingly similar to
such a contract as to dictate the allowance of the 'passing-on de-
fense.' "66 The court claimed to restrict the defense to "situations
which are easily provable,"6 but failed to consider the effect of the
overcharge on plaintiffs overall sales volume. The evidence offers
no indication that Union sold the bags under preexisting contracts
that fixed the quantity to be purchased. Thus, it is likely that plain-
tiff did in fact sustain some damage as a result of the alleged viola-
tion."6
In contrast to Obron is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Yoder
Brothers v. California-Florida Plant Corp.," an action involving a
claim for infringement of twenty-one chrysanthemum plant patents
and counterclaims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."
Yoder sought to assert the passing-on defense to the antitrust
counterclaims, alleging that its arrangement with the plant corpo-
ration fell within the cost-plus exception. The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined, however, that Yoder had not overcome "the almost
'insurmountable' burden of showing that the factors that led the
Supreme Court to reject the pass-on defense do not apply." Even
assuming that the impact of the overcharge could be measured after
the fact, that the plant corporation would not otherwise have raised
or maintained its higher price, and that alternative plaintiffs would
be readily available to vindicate the antitrust laws, the court never-
theless concluded that Yoder had not shown the effect of the over-
charge on total sales and costs per unit for a different volume of total
sales." "Simple economics," the court noted, "suggests that sales
would have increased at lower prices," and "[s]ince the difference
66. 355 F. Supp. at 906.
67. Id. at 907.
68. Schaefer, supra note 28, at 926. This conclusion assumes, of course, that the de-
mand for mesh window bags was not perfectly inelastic. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
But see text accompanying notes 100-01 infra.
69. 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
71. 537 F.2d at 1375.
72. Id.
1980]
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in total sales is an uncertain figure, the breakdown of that figure
into cost per unit plus profit is equally uncertain. 7 3 Thus, Yoder
avoided the problem that the Obron court failed to recognize in a
way that seems consistent with Hanover Shoe.74 Despite its appar-
ent logic, however, the Fifth Circuit no longer believes Yoder's treat-
ment of the passing-on issue is viable. 5
IV. THE COST-PLUS EXCEPTION AFTER Illinois Brick-A FUNCTIONAL
EQUIVALENT
A. Recent Decisions
In the wake of Illinois Brick, two circuits have considered the
cost-plus exception to the rule barring passing-on claims and have
reached irreconcilable results. The first of these decisions, Mid-
West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.,76 dealt with a
series of private antitrust actions instituted in response to a grand
jury indictment charging five corporations and seven individuals
engaged in the manufacture of consumer bags77 with price-fixing in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.7" The Mid-West court's
strict formulation of the exception foreshadowed its ultimate hold-
ing: the court declared that indirect purchaser-plaintiffs79 must
show "a pre-existing, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contract" at every
point in the distribution chain at which the goods changed hands.8
The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to further discovery in
order to fit their cases within the exception. The court, however,
73. Id. at 1375-76.
74. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
75. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1164 n.20 (5th Cir. 1979).
See Part IV infra.
76. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979). The case came to the Third Circuit on appeal from an
order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting defendant's
motions for summary judgment on the basis of Illinois Brick and dismissing the suits in their
entirety.
77. Consumer bags are "single or multilayered paper bags that may also contain linings
or coatings made from other materials and that are employed to prepackage products then
marketed in them." Id. at 575. Designed for capacities of less than twenty-five pounds, the
bags often have printed exterior designs describing their contents, which include such prod-
ucts as pet food, cookies, tea, coffee, and chemicals. Id.
78. See United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Only the corporations were named as defendants in the private civil action, however.
79. Three categories of plaintiffs sued for treble damages and injunctive relief: first,
supermarkets and retail grocery stores that did not purchase bags directly, but purchased
products packaged therein for resale; second, a grocery store that sold packaged products and
also purchased empty bags from middlemen and wholesalers in which it packaged its own
brand of ice cream; and third, a middleman that purchased bags for resale to automobile
manufacturers who put machine parts in the bags. 596 F.2d at 575-76. This Recent Develop-
ment is concerned only with the first group-the indirect purchasers.
80. Id. at 577.
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rejected this request as a mere attempt to delay the inevitable.81
First, the court declined plaintiffs' invitation to delete the "fixed-
quantity" requirement, reasoning that Illinois Brick demands that
the direct purchaser alone be awarded the full recovery in a variable
quantity situation. Absent such a requirement the court would be
forced to analyze the terms of each transaction to determine
whether the direct or indirect purchaser was damaged.82 Second, the
court summarily rejected plaintiff's contention that the exception
should include "informal arrangements and patterns of cost-plus
pricing" 3 and instead adhered to the Supreme Court's rejection of
"cost-based rules of thumb."" Thus, the Third Circuit's decision in
Mid- West represents a strict reading of the already narrow cost-plus
exception.
Less than five months later, however, the Fifth Circuit in In re
Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation5 recognized a "functional equiv-
alent" to the cost-plus exception. A thorough review of the complex
facts is necessary to understand the court's holding. Plaintiffs, cat-
tlemen, ranchers, and feeders, contended that defendants, twenty-
five retail food chains, a wholesale grocer, the retail chains' national
trade association, and a beef industry price reporting publication,
had conspired to fix at artificially low levels the price at which beef
was purchased from meat packers and slaughterhouses in violation
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The resulting price depres-
sions were allegedly passed up the distribution chain to the
producer-plaintiffs. 6 On this basis, plaintiffs sought treble damages
and injunctive relief under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.
More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that during any given week,
the retail chains in a particular geographical area were able to set
the wholesale price for beef by wielding monopsony or oligopsony
power. A designated chain in each area would buy its beef at
wholesale early in the week; the prices offered by leading purchasers
across the nation were then reported in the "National Provisioner
Daily Market and News Service" and other retail chains followed
81. Id. at 580.
82. Id. at 577-78 n.9. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
83. 596 F.2d at 577 n.9.
84. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
85. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979) (Wisdom, J.). The case involved thirteen private
antitrust actions assigned to the District Court for the Northern District of Texas for coordi-
nated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 419 F.
Supp. 720 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit., 1976).
86. This phenomenon is known as inverted passing-on. See note 15 supra.
87. "Monopoly" refers to price fixing by sellers. "Monopsony" and "oligopsony" refer




the price established by the regional leader in purchasing their re-
quirements. The chains' monopsony or oligopsony power, coupled
with the packers' inability to withhold the beef for long terms,U
allegedly facilitated this control over wholesale prices. Finally,
plaintiffs claimed they had no choice but to accept the packers'
depressed prices due to the inelasticity of the fat cattle supply in
the short term." The packers' prices were allegedly derived directly
from quotations in the trade publication-and hence from the ac-
tion of defendants-with the result that "the allegedly artificially
low wholesale prices established by the retail chains' combination
translate directly into artificially low prices for fat cattle." 0
The district court, basing its decision on Illinois Brick, dis-
missed the complaints for failure to state claims upon which relief
could be granted." The Fifth Circuit initially rejected plaintiffs'
"ambitious contention" that Illinois Brick had no application to
price-fixing suits brought by sellers against indirect purchasers.'"
The court also refused to recognize an exception based on plaintiffs'
suggestion that the packers had conspired with the retailers, with
the result that the latter "controlled" the former within the mean-
ing of footnote sixteen of Illinois Brick. 3 The court did, however,
permit the plaintiffs to pursue their claims in light of allegations
that brought them within the cost-plus exception.
Judge Wisdom initially conceded that "the Court meant the
scope of the exception to be narrow," but added that "it did not
88. The packers allegedly had no long-term storage facilities. Id. at 1154.
89. See note 15 supra. If they were to withhold their supply, the plaintiffs claimed the
cattle would become over-fattened and hence less valuable. 600 F.2d at 1154.
90. Id. at 1154-55.
91. Id. at 1153.
92. Id. at 1158. The plaintiffs argued that the harm suffered by sellers in such cases is
much greater than that suffered by indirect purchasers in straight passing-on situations, and
thereby justifies tackling the proof and multiple liability problems that the Illinois Brick rule
was designed to avoid. The plaintiffs claimed that a purchaser in a monopolistic market can
seek substitutes elsewhere, whereas a seller faced with monopsony or oligopsony price-fixing
must accept the depressed price or refuse to sell at all. The court initially responded by noting
that both situations give rise to "restrictions in industry output and the consequent realloca-
tion of resources to less valuable uses." Id. (footnote omitted). More importantly, the court
reasoned that any incremental harm that might flow from unremedied monopsony or oligop-
sony price-fixing schemes would not warrant creating an exception to Illinois Brick, even
assuming, as plaintiffs did, that the Supreme Court had balanced the deterrence and com-
pensation rationales against considerations of judicial economy and fairness to defendants
and concluded that some price-fixing schemes must go unremedied by private damage ac-
tions. Id. at 1158-59.
93. See note 8 supra. The court responded that this co-conspiracy theory was not set
forth in plaintiffs' complaints. Further, it declared that "[i]f the act of passing-on sufficed
to brand the intermediary as a co-conspirator the asserted exception would wholly swallow
the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick rule." 600 F.2d at 1161.
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imply that only cases involving cost-plus contracts qualify."" In
short, the court reasoned that any situation in which the impact of
an overcharge on a middleman's pricing decisions can be deter-
mined without reference to the interactions of supply and demand
would avoid the economic uncertainties and potential multiple lia-
bility that prompted the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick rule. More
significantly, however, the court went beyond this general proposi-
tion to repudiate its earlier rationale in Yoder Brothers v.
California-Florida Plant Corp.," and to rely on a new argument as
the essential justification for its holding:
Functional equivalence is not lost simply because the proponent of passing-on
theory cannot demonstrate that the middleman suffered no loss in volume as
the result of raising the price to his customers. In the cost-plus contract case
itself, the middleman is likely to have suffered a loss of volume and hence
profits as a result of the overcharge. His higher selling price will likely have
caused potential customers to forego his product. . . .The middleman's loss
of volume and the indirect purchaser's absorption of the overcharge are wholly
separable items of damage."
Underlying this conclusion was the court's view that cases like
Yoder, which required proof that the intermediary suffered no harm
as a prerequisite to assertion of the passing-on defense, rested on the
erroneous premise that vigorous enforcement of private treble dam-
ages actions was of paramount concern to the Hanover Shoe Court.
Illinois Brick made clear, however, that the difficulty of proof prob-
lem, not the antitrust enforcement interests, was the underlying
concern in Hanover Shoe.'7 Absent such evidentiary problems, "the
policy in favor of vigorous antitrust enforcement must sometimes
give way [and the passing-on defense be permitted] in face of the
risk of overpunishing antitrust violators."" The converse is also
true-that offensive use of passing-on must be permitted, notwith-
standing any impact of an overcharge on a direct purchaser's sales
volume, so long as the fact of passing-on can be proved without
reference to the interactions of supply and demand.
94. Id. at 1163. The court went on to say that "any situation in which [the impact of]
the overcharge is essentially determined in advance 'without reference to the interactions of
supply and demand' would function in the same way." Id. at 1164 (quoting Note, supra note
5, at 331 n.93). Interestingly, the only example of such a situation posed in the quoted Note
is that in which a single buyer sues for an overcharge on a single purchase passed on by an
intermediary using cost-based rules of thumb. Note, supra note 5, at 330 n.93. That the facts
in the instant case present infinitely more complex problems of proof should be apparent.
95. 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); see text accompa-
nying notes 69-73 & 75 supra.
96. 600 F.2d at 1164.
97. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.




The holding of Beef Industry is analytically sound insofar as it
separates the question of reduced sales volume from the issue of
passing-on. Indeed, the Court in Illinois Brick seems to have recog-
nized this severability, but simply failed to admit it." Moreover,
allowance of the cost-plus exception is itself tantamount to recogni-
tion of the severability of volume issues from passing-on per se; as
the Fifth Circuit noted, even when the quantity to be purchased is
fixed in the indirect purchaser's contract, the direct purchaser may
still be injured to the extent his higher prices caused potential cus-
tomers to purchase elsewhere.'" To deny the logic of Beef Industry,
therefore, is to deny an essential premise underlying the cost-plus
exception.
It is unfortunate, however, that the Fifth Circuit chose such an
uncomfortable fact situation in which to clarify the sales volume/
passing-on dichotomy. Careful to emphasize that the dismissal
below had been on the pleadings, the court nevertheless made broad
concessions to the plaintiffs by allowing them to "firm up" their
proof in the pretrial stage.101 The cattlemen alleged that the packers
had set their prices for live cattle by strictly applying certain formu-
lae to the wholesale price reported in the trade publication. Given
this allegation, the court concluded that if a plaintiff could prove
both "what the competitive wholesale price would have been for a
given grade of beef in a given region at a given time" and that the
intermediary to whom he sold strictly applied a formula to the trade
publication price for the particular sale, then the plaintiff would be
entitled "to damages in the amount of the difference between the
price he actually received on that sale of fat cattle and the price he
would have received absent price-fixing (computed by applying the
packer's formula to the constructed competitive wholesale
price). '"102 Such proof would, in the court's view, provide the func-
tional equivalent of a cost-plus contract.
It is difficult to reconcile this analysis with the court's prior
emphasis on difficulty of proof as the principle justification for the
Illinois Brick rule.10 Judge Wisdom rejected defendants' contention
that the packers' pricing mechanisms were analogous to the "cost-
99. See note 31 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 96 supra. See also note 47 supra.
101. Compare the Third Circuit's approach in Mid-West, in which the court held that
"plaintiffs may not, consonant with the summary judgment procedure, insist upon taking a
roundabout, lengthy, and costly, discovery route before submitting to the inevitable conclu-
sion that their actions for treble damages cannot prevail." 596 F.2d at 580.
102. 600 F.2d at 1165 (emphasis supplied).
103. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
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based rules of thumb" specifically rejected by the Supreme Court
as exceptions to the passing-on rule.104 He noted that, whereas the
Illinois Brick plaintiffs alleged that the middlemen purported to
charge a fixed percentage markup, the allegation here was that the
packers in fact engaged in formula pricing.105 The court reasoned
that if a packer absorbed any part of the loss resulting from the
wholesale price depression, it would be readily detectable because
the packer would have either changed his purchasing formulae or
paid a higher price for choice cattle than he would have paid had
he adhered to his customary formulae. 106 Given the multiplicity of
factors that come to bear on a middleman's pricing decisions,
10 7
however, such formulae would seem less reliable "in the real eco-
nomic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model."10 The
court's acceptance of these formulae would therefore appear to con-
flict with the express language of Illinois Brick. os Finally, although
the court admitted that it might be classifying market situations
according to the likelihood of passing-on and its susceptibility to
proof,"0 it argued that "the Supreme Court itself engaged in such a
process in suggesting exceptions to its bar against the use of passing-
on theories.""' Albeit a question of semantics, such an argument
does not sufficiently reconcile the court's analysis with the teaching
of Illinois Brick. It is one thing to describe a mechanism, such as
the cost-plus contract, that will give rise to the exception; it is quite
another to compile a number of business and economic factors that
collectively parallel that mechanism. Thus, to the extent that it was
fashioning an economic analogue to the cost-plus contract, the court
should have admitted that it was tracking on new ground.
104. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
105. 600 F.2d at 1165. Judge Wisdom may, however, have raised a distinction without
a difference. As the authority relied upon by the Supreme Court observed:
Virtually all the recent evidence on full cost pricing practices shows that firms do
not in fact apply rigid profit margins, regardless of demand conditions. They vary the
margin to suit the product: the more elastic the demand, the lower the margin. Or in
some bizarre cases. . .. they applied fixed margins, but juggled their cost allocations
to achieve the same result.
F. SCHERER, supra note 52, at 176.
106. 600 F.2d at 1165. Additionally, the court observed that packers purportedly have
no reason to depart from their purchasing formulae in the short run due to the short-term
inelasticity of the fat cattle supply. Id.; see note 15 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 39-40 & 53-55 supra.
108. 392 U.S. at 493.
109. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
110. See text accompanying note 56 supra.




Speaking for the majority in Illinois Brick, Mr. Justice White
observed that, "as we understand the dissenters' argument, it re-
duces to the proposition that because antitrust cases are already
complicated, there is little harm in making them more so. We disa-
gree.""' Although the Supreme Court properly identified the com-
peting policies necessary to evaluate the legal and practical implica-
tions of passing-on, by raising a nearly absolute bar to the assertion
of such claims, the Court may have been too short-sighted."' The
Fifth Circuit implicitly recognized this shortcoming when it pointed
out the severability of passing-on claims from those relating to re-
duced sales volume. In addition, the Fifth Circuit apparently has
responded to Mr. Justice White's admonition by noting that al-
though "the proposed proof of damages is far from simple . . . this
is a complexity born of quantity. The kinds of proof that will be
involved . . . are not new to courts, and certainly not to antitrust
courts.""' However regrettable the factual context in which it arose,
the Beef Industry holding should prompt a reconsideration of the
scope of the cost-plus exception and will doubtless provide impor-
tant guidance in future passing-on litigation.
DAVID KERR HERZOG
112. 431 U.S. at 743 n.27.
113. Note, supra note 5, at 311.
114. 600 F.2d at 1167.
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